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Comments
Unconscionability and the Enforcement
of Standardized Contracts in
Commercial Transactions
Section 2-316(2)' of the Uniform Commercial Code permits
conspicuous2 written disclaimers of warranties, and section 2-719(3)1
allows the limitation of damages for a breach of warranty. Attempts
to rely on standardized form provisions which contain disclaimers ex-
pressly allowed by the UCC may collide, however, with UCC section
2-3024 which declares unenforceable any contract or clause that is un-
1. U.C.C. §2-316(2) provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchan-
tability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of
a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude
all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
All references in this comment are to sections of the U.C.C., unless otherwise noted.
2. U.C.C. §1-201(10) provides:
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading
in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language
in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type
or color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous." Whether a term or
clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision by the court.
3. U.C.C. §2-719(3) provides:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion
is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in
the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages
where the loss is commercial is not.
Cf. CAL. CoM. CODE §2719(3), which provides:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion
is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in
the case of consumer goods is invalid unless it is proved that the limitation is not
unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages where the loss is commercial
is valid unless it is proved that the limitation is unconscionable.
The California Legislature amended the section to clarify the allocation of the burden of proof.
See CAL. COM. CODE §2719 (California Law Revision Commission comment).
4. U.C.C. §2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
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conscionable at the time the contract is made. In A&M Produce Co.
v. FMC Corp.,5 a California appellate court held a conspicuous
disclaimer of warranty unconscionable despite compliance with sec-
tion 2-316.6 A clause limiting the damages recoverable upon breach
of warranty by the seller in accordance with section 2-719(3) was also
held unconscionable.7 Although section 2-302 was not included in the
initial California version of the Uniform Commercial Code,8 the court
in A&M Produce held that unconscionability was a part of the com-
mon law of California. 9 In addition, the court relied on the 1979
adoption of California Civil Code section 1670.5,10 which is identical
to UCC section 2-302 and applicable to all contracts, rather than merely
to transactions in goods.II The court in A&M Produce indicated that
both procedural and substantive unconscionability must exist before
a commercial contract term is held unconscionable.' 2 A sliding scale
approach was adopted for determining how much of each type of
unconscionability was necessary to find a contract or clause unen-
forceable: if an inordinate amount of procedural unconscionability
were present, less substantive unconscionability would be needed, and
vice versa.' 3
This comment will examine the unique facts of the A&M Produce
case and note how those facts differ from the typical case in which
unconscionability has been offered as a bar to enforcement of a stan-
dardized term." Two possible holdings of the case will be considered:
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to pre-
sent evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
5. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
6. Id. at 493, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
9. 135 Cal. App. 3d at 484, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
10. Id. at 485, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
11. See CAL. CIV. CODE §1670.5; Report on Assembly Bill 510, 1979 AssEm. J. 9231, 1979
SENATE J. 7091.
12. 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121; see also Chretian v. Donald L. Bren
Co., 151 Cal. App. 3d 385, 389, 198 Cal. Rptr. 523, 525 (1984) (a second Fourth District
Court of Appeal decision following the A&M Produce analysis); Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank,
141 Cal. App. 3d 200, 207-08, 190 Cal. Rptr. 204, 209-10 (1983), hearing granted (Cal., July
20, 1983). The First District Court of Appeal adopted the procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability analysis of the A&M Produce decision. Id.
13. A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
14. See infra notes 91-160 and accompanying text.
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one narrowly drawn from the facts, and a broader holding with greater
precedential value"s which is a natural result of judicial policy developed
from the increased use of standardized contracts.'6 Further support
for the broader holding is attributable to the California common-law
use of unconscionability and the doctrine developed in other jurisdic-
tions under section 2-302.'" The competing interests of the buyer and
seller in a commercial transaction also will be examined to ascertain
a commercially reasonable risk allocation in warranty disclaimers and
disclaimers of consequential damages.' 8 Finally, judicial standards of
review will be proposed which will follow the basic analytical
framework of A&M Produce but avoid the possibility of an unfair
application of the sliding scale test used in that case.' 9 The starting
point, then, is to look at judicial responses to standardized contract
forms and traditional assumptions about the bargaining process.
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE USE OF STANDARD FORMS
At common law, freedom of contract was a right zealously pro-
tected by the courts.2 0 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, any attempt by a government entity to regulate the marketplace
was considered a violation of the contracting parties' substantive rights
of due process." The bargain theory of consideration" was prevalent
during this period; courts reasoned that freedom of contract max-
imized the welfare of the parties.2 Even if an aggrieved party could
demonstrate that particular terms of a contract were unfair, courts
remained hesitant to rewrite the contract.2 4
Even under freedom of contract theory, good faith in the perfor-
mance of contracts became a well-settled requirement in California
common law as well as in the UCC. 2' Legislatures and courts have
15. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 20-48 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 53-89 and accompanying text (California common law) and notes 164-187
and accompanying text (general UCC section 2-302 doctrine).
18. See infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 207-222 and accompanying text.
20. See F. KESSLER & M. SHAu, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 4-5 (1953); E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §1.7 (1982).
21. See e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914); Adair v. U. S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22. Under the bargain theory, of consideration, a court makes no inquiry into the fairness
of the exchange. Bargaining merely requires an exchange of promises. E. FARNsWORTH, supra
note 20, at §2.2.
23. See F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, supra note 20, at 4; E. FARNsWORTH, supra note 20, at §1.7.
24. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, at §1.7.
25. U.C.C. §1-203; see also 1 B. WrrsiN, Sur NARY OF CAIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §576
(8th ed. 1973) (California common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing).
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been reluctant to extend a duty of good faith to the bargaining
process.2 6 The UCC does not require that the parties bargain in good
faith.27 Traditional notions of contract law, while not requiring good
faith, do provide that a seller has a duty to avoid overreaching in
the formation of a contract.2" Against this background, the prevalence
of standard or form contracts in modern commercial transactions has
increased the attention given to the bargaining process and posed dif-
ficulties for courts using traditional rules to govern the negotiation
and performance of contracts. 29
Another set of considerations is presented by commentators who
note that certain social benefits are produced through the use of stan-
dardized forms.3" Sellers of mass produced goods or services using
standardized forms can reduce the time required to complete transac-
tions, the costs of these transactions, and their potential liability in
the event of breach.3" The reductions lead to greater manufacturing
and distributing efficiency and ultimately lower costs.3 2
Although form contracts have received intensified scrutiny in re-
cent years, especially when the standard form is characterized as a
contract of adhesion,33 no general rules applicable to form contracts
26. See United States v. Braunstein, 75 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), appeal disnissed,
168 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1948). But cf. Summers, "Good Faith" In General Contract Law and
the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 223-25 (1968).
The author claims that Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) establishes
the beginning of a duty of good faith in the conduct of contract negotiations. Id.; RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §41 comment f, illustration 8 (1981) Use of reasonable time
for acceptance of an offer for speculative purposes may indicate a lack of good faith. This
creates a duty to negotiate in good faith).
27. See generally Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHm. L. REv. 666, 668 (1963). Farnsworth iden-
tifies only two types of good faith required in the UCC: good faith performance and good
faith purchase. Id. But cf. Dugan, Good Faith and the Enforceability of Standardized Terms,
22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1980). Dugan asserts that the basis for a good faith duty
of formation for standardized contracts exists in the U.C.C. as well as a good faith duty of
performance. Id.; Summers, supra note 26, at 220-21(bad faith in formation and negotiation).
28. See Summers, supra note 26, at 203, 216.
29. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLuM. L. REV. 629, 631-32 (1943); see also Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the
Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1278-79 (1967).
Tobriner and Grodin focused on techniques used by courts to impose obligations on public
service enterprises, despite contractual disclaimers to the contrary. Id.
30. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 818 n.15, 623. P.2d 165, 171 n.15,
171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 610 n.15 (1981)(citing Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Suggested
Redefinition and its Application to Banking, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 297, 301-05 (1978)); K.
LLWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 (1960); Kessler, supra note
29, at 632.
31. See K. LLWELLYN, supra note 30, at 362; Kessler, supra note 29, at 631-32; Slawson,
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV.
529, 530 (1971).
32. See Kessler, supra note 29, at 631-32.
33. See, e.g., Graham, 28 Cal. 3d at 819-20, 623 P.2d at 172-73, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12
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have emerged. Rather, analysis on a case-by-case basis is still the norm.
Courts, using freedom of contract theory, often consider these terms
like other contract terms, as the equivalent of private legislation by
the contracting parties.3" The traditional duty to read a contract has
been increasingly subverted, however, when the contract is a stan-
dard form.15 Thus, when buyers have admittedly not read the
boilerplate, courts have refused enforcement of the terms through the
use of theories like failure of assent and contravention of public
policy.36 This use of "covert" means provides little guidance, however,
for courts presented with similar fact situations in the future.37 Fur-
ther, statutory provisions have placed substantial limits on freedom
of contract in a variety of factual settings. Insurance companies are
barred from excluding certain terms in their contracts.3 8 Labor negotia-
tions involving collective bargaining carry a requirement that the par-
ticipants bargain in good faith.39 Contracts for essential services such
as utilities and housing restrict how a "seller" may terminate these
services." Exculpatory clauses exempting a party from liability resulting
from willful injury are unenforceable as a matter of public policy."
In addition to these specific examples, forceful arguments have been
made that further limits should be recognized as a general proposi-
tion whenever one party is able to dominate the transaction by dic-
tating nearly all the terms. "2 The rationale for these arguments is that
(promotion of music concert); Henrioulle v. Marin Venture, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 518-19, 573
P.2d 465, 468-69, 143 Cal. Rptr. 247, 250-51 (1978) (lease); TunkI v. Regents of the University
of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 100-01, 383 P.2d 441, 446-47, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 38-39 (1963)
(hospital admission form); Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 879, 377 P.2d
284, 295, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 183 (1962) (insurance policy); A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d
at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (sales contract).
34. See Kessler, supra note 29, at 640; see also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960) "[Standardized contracts] resemble a lav rather than a meeting
of the minds" (citation omitted). Id.; Dugan, The Application of Substantive Unconscionabil-
ity to Standardized Contracts -A Systematic Approach, 18 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 77, 80 (1982)
(standardized forms compete with public legislation).
35. See Calamari, Duty to Read - A Changing Concept, 43 FoRoDtA L. REv. 341, 351-52
(1974).
36. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 H.av. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939).
37. Id.
38. CAL. INS. CODE §10160.
39. 29 U.S.C. §§141-144, 151-158, 159-167, 171-183, 185-187, 191-197, 557.
40. CAL. PUB. Um.L. CODE §§779-80 (Utilities).
41. CAL. CIV. CODE §1668.
42. F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, supra note 20, at 7-8 (crediting Justice Holmes with early
formulation of this argument); Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability 31 U. PiTt. L.
REv. 1, 28 (1969) "There is no freedom of contract in the equal treatment of unequals." (fn.
omitted); see also J. COLEMAN, POWVER AND THE STRUCTURE OF SocmrET 78-80 (1974). Coleman
criticizes the courts for failing to acknowledge that the seller controls much of the flow of
information in a transaction between a large corporation and a consumer or a small corpora-
tion, resulting in no true freedom of contract. Id.
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in one-sided contracts, freedom of contract is actually nonexistant.43
Professors Llewellyn and Murray have argued that boilerplate terms
should be discarded when they conflict with terms expressly agreed
upon or when the terms are "manifestly unreasonable and unfair." '44
Recently, commentators have advocated more extreme positions. One
view is premised on the notion that due to the prevalence of sellers
with monopolistic powers in the marketplace, the buyer, even in a
commercial transaction, requires greater protection than the traditional
analysis affords.4 A second view is that the form contract has become
an institution46 and is so powerful a tool that the terms of a form
contract initially should be considered unenforceable." The burden
then would be on the drafter seeking to enforce the contract as writ-
ten to prove that the terms were fair and reasonable.48
The use of standard forms, with terms dictated by a seller and ad-
mittedly not read by the buyer,49 provides social benefits in lower
costs for sellers. Unconscionability would seem to be a direct approach
to resolving the tensions created by the use of standard forms and
the application of traditional analysis under freedom of contract con-
cepts. Instead of using "tools of misconstruction," ' 0 courts should
develop guidelines for later use in determining what is the "minimum
decency"'" allowable to enforce a particular clause. 2 A review of un-
conscionability in both California and under UCC section 2-302 sup-
ports the application of unconscionability as a useful legal theory.
UNCONSCIONABILITY
Unconscionability is an old concept developed by courts of equity."
The equity courts would not enforce a bargain "such as no man in
his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and
as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." '54 When con-
43. F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, supra note 20, at 7-8; Murray, supra note 42, at 28.
44. See K. LLwEU.YN, supra note 30, at 370-71; Murray, supra note 42, at 23-28 (materiality
of risk allocation).
45. Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1151, 1183 (1976).
46. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion; An Essay in Recontruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1174,
1229 (1983).
47. Id. at 1242-43.
48. Id. at 1269.
49. See Calamari, supra note 35, at 352.
50. Llewellyn, supra note 36, at 703.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See J. CALUALRI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§9-38 (2d ed. 1977).
54. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889), quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen,
2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750).
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sidering claims, equity courts looked to overall imbalance to ascer-
tain the presence of unconscionability." Cases using the concept of
unconscionability in equity provide little guidance for courts that seek
to use the concept in commercial sales transactions,56 since those cases
often involved a sale of real estate or a party with a particularly distinct
bargaining disadvantage.5 7
In California, unconscionability was not well defined as a common-
law doctrine.58 Rather, to achieve fair results, courts used theories
of estoppel, fraud, oppression, and undue influence, or construed am-
biguous terms against the drafter. 9 Few of the cases involved com-
mercial transactions60 or transactions in goods.'
When the California Commercial Code was adopted in 1963, the
unconscionability provisions of section 2-302 were not included.62
Believing that California courts already had sufficient power in equity
to delete unconscionable provisions in contracts, 63 the Legislature feared
that section 2-302 would lead to greater uncertainty in and more
judicial rewriting of commercial contracts.64 The use of section 2-302
to protect consumers was considered unnecessary since the retail in-
stallment sales acts provided limitations on the conduct of retail
sellers. 65 By 1979, however, the view of the California Legislature
changed, and Civil Code section 1670.5 was adopted. 66 Two recent
cases decided after the enactment of Civil Code section 1670.5, in-
cluding A&M Produce, are worthy of note because they involved form
contracts in a commercial setting and the existence of an unconscion-
able clause was at issue.
55. See Left, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485, 539 (1967).
56. See id. at 533.
57. See id. at 533-37. Left claims that the "equity criteria are fitted only to nonmass
transactions." Id. at 537.
58. See H. MARSH & W. WARREN, REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE BY THE SENATE FACT FIND-
ING COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY, 456 (1961). Professors Marsh and Warren stated that courts
often reached the desired results by finding contract clauses to be ambiguous or by invoking
the doctrine of mutuality. Id. [hereinafter cited as H. MARSH & W. WARREN].
59. See Roos, The Doctrine of Unconscionabihity: Alive and Well in California, 9 CAL.
W.L. REv. 100, 103-08 and cases cited therein (1972).
60. But see Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
61. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966) (insurance); Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1962) (insurance).
62. Report on Assembly Bill 510, 1979 AssEM. J. 9231, 1979 SENATE J. 7091.
63. See H. MARSH & W. WARREN, supra note 58, at 456.
64. See Roos, supra note 59, at 102.
65. See 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 135 n.30 (1962).
66. See A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 487 n.12, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 123 n.12; see
also Report on Assembly Bill 510, 1979 AssEM. J. 9231, 1979 SENATE J. 7091.
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A. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.67 was the first California Supreme Court
decision to discuss unconscionability after the enactment of Civil Code
section 1670.5. As acknowledged by the California Supreme Court,
that code section could not be applied since it had been adopted after
litigation was commenced and was not retroactive.6" The court never-
theless adopted by analogy the purpose of section 1670.5 in reaching
the result. The court first recognized that bargaining inequality can
exist between two parties of apparent equal economic size with resul-
tant implications for unconscionability.69 The plaintiff, Bill Graham,
was an experienced promoter and producer of musical concerts.7" Musi-
cian Leon Russell hired Graham to promote four of his concerts, sign-
ing a separate contract for each of the concerts.7 ' Russell was a member
of the American Federation of Musicians,72 and the standardized form
of A.F. of M. was used for all four contracts." A dispute arose after
one concert resulted in a loss.74 Under the contract provisions, a dispute
regarding allocation of the loss was to be submitted to arbitration
with the referee selected by the A.F. of M.75 The arbitration award
favored Russell.76 Scissor-Tail, Inc., Russell's company, petitioned
the superior court to confirm the arbitration award and Graham peti-
tioned the court to vacate the award.77 The supreme court found the
contracts to be contracts of adhesion and the arbitration clauses at
issue were found unconscionable. 8 To characterize the agreement as
an adhesion contract, the court used the definition enunciated in Neal
v. State Farm Insurance Companies:" a standardized contract, drafted
by the party with superior bargaining power, is an adhesion contract
when the party of lesser strength has only the choice of "take it or
leave it." 8 Since A.F. of M. union rules provided that members
could sign only the standardized contracts issued by the union, Russell,
was found to have been in a superior bargaining position; Graham
67. 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
68. Id. at 805, 820 n.19, 623 P.2d 165, 173 n.19, 171 Cal Rptr. 604, 612 n.19.
69. Id. at 818-19, 623 P.2d at 717-72, 171 Cal. Rptr. 610-11.
70. Id. at 812, 623 P.2d at 167, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 812, 623 P.2d at 167, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
74. Id. at 813-14, 623 P.2d at 167-68, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
75. Id. at 814-16, 623 P.2d at 168-69, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09.
76. Id. at 816, 623 P.2d at 169, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 825, 623 P.2d at 176, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
79. 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (1961).
80. Graham, 28 Cal. 3d at 817, 623 P.2d at 171, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
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had only a "take it or leave it" choice.81 Thus, the agreement was
an adhesion contract even though Graham was a prominent and suc-
cessful promoter and even though, according to Graham's own
testimony, he had been a party to thousands of A.F. of M. contracts
and was well aware of the provisions."
Having determined that the agreement was an adhesion contract,
the supreme court strictly scrutinized the contract terms and adopted
a "minimum levels of integrity" test for provisions claimed uncon-
scionable, and therefore, unenforceable.8 3 The arbitration clause at
issue in Graham, in the opinion of the court, afforded no real and
fair opportunity for the adherent to prevail in a dispute arbitrated
under this contract term. 4 Therefore, applying the "minimum levels
of integrity" test, the court found the clause unconscionable.85
The Graham court has been criticized for finding that the contract
at issue was one of adhesion. 6 One commentator suggests that Graham
was not an adherent since he entered into many concert promotion
transactions and because his principal obligation was not to pay
money. 7 Another commentator has criticized the decision for the deter-
mination that Graham was in a position of bargaining inferiority.88
The commentator argues that a promoter as successful as Graham
had sufficient bargaining power to avoid bad bargains with musicians
and consequently the court should not have interfered with the resulting
contract.89
Despite criticisms of the Graham decision, the analysis of the case
had an immediate impact on California law. One year later, a Califor-
nia appellate court decided A&M Produce, a case which incorporated
the unconscionability analysis set forth in Graham. 0 Following the
Graham analysis of unequal bargaining power, the court in A&M Pro-
81. Id. at 818-19, 623 P.2d at 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
82. Id. at 821, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
83. Id. at 825, 623 P.2d at 176, 171 Cal Rptr. at 615, citing Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
84. Id. at 825, 623 P.2d at 176, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
85. Id.
86. See Rakoff, supra note 46, at 1191 n.64; Note, Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.: Uncon-
scionability of Presumptively Biased Arbitration Clauses Within Adhesion Contracts, 70 CALIF.
L. REv. 1014, 1028-29 (1982).
87. Rakoff, supra note 46, at 1177 (reciting seven elements of an adhesion contract: (1)
printed form purported to be a contract, (2) drafted by one party to the transaction, (3) draft-
ing party enters into numerous, routine transactions of this type, (4) few terms are negotiable
by the adherent, (5) the document is signed by the adherent following bargaining over dickered
terms, (6) the adherent enters few such transactions, and (7) the principal obligation of the
adherent is to pay money.)(Emphasis added.)
88. Note, supra note 86, at 1028-29.
89. Id.
90. 135 Cal. App. 3d at 487-88, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
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duce explained the application of unconscionability concepts in com-
mercial transactions.
B. A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.
In A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., the buyer, A&M, purchased
a weight-sizing machine from FMC for processing tomatoes. 9' When
the machine failed to process the tomatoes properly, A&M filed an
action against FMC for breach of express warranty and breach of
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.92 FMC relied
as an affirmative defense upon waivers of warranties and consequen-
tial damages contained in the contract, and requested enforcement
of the contract as written. 9 A&M argued that the waivers were un-
conscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. 94 FMC also cross-
complained for the remainder due from A&M on the contract. 9
Either a weight-sizing machine or a large labor force is essential
to tomato farming operations.9 6 Although C. Alex Abatti, owner of
A&M, had farmed all his life, he was inexperienced in growing
tomatoes and purchasing weight-sizing machines.97 After receiving bids
from two companies, 98 Abatti purchased the FMC weight-sizing
machine for $32,041.80. 99 The competitor's bid had estimated the cost
of the machine to be between $60,000 and $68,000."o°
Abatti apparently was aware that a major reason for the signifi-
cant price differential was the absence of a hydrocooler on the FMC
machine. 10 Due to his lack of experience in weight-sizing machines,
however, Abatti relied on the representations of FMC that the high
operating speed of the FMC machine made a hydrocooler unnecessary
and that the machine otherwise would satisfy the needs of A&M."'0
FMC knew that A&M had never grown tomatoes or purchased a
weight-sizing machine and that Abatti was relying on the expertise
of the representatives of FMC.'I
91. Id. at 478, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
92. Id. at 479-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18.
93. Id. at 480-81, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
94. Id. at 485, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
95. Id. at 480, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
96. Id. at 478, 480, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18.
97. Id. at 478, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 479, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
100. Id. at 478, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
103. Id.
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The form contract supplied by FMC included on its face in capital
letters a clause stating that the seller agreed to sell "upon and sub-
ject to the terms and conditions on the face and back hereof."'' 0 4
The terms on the back included a warranty disclaimer and a disclaimer
of consequential damages." 5 FMC only warranted that the equipment
was free from defects in material and workmanship for a period of
twelve months or 500 hours of operation, whichever came first.'0 6
Repair or replacement of the defective equipment, at -the option of
FMC, was the sole obligation assumed by FMC. °7 Abatti's attention
was not specifically directed to these clauses."'0
Shortly after the submission of a preliminary bid by FMC, Abatti
signed a "field order" which authorized FMC to order the
equipment. 09 Later, a form clearly labelled "Conditional Sales Con-
tract" was mailed to A&M." 0 Abatti presumably had adequate time
to seek legal advice or, at least, to read the form before returning
a signed copy to FMC."'
Abatti signed the agreement and the machine was delivered." 2 The
machine, however, was not satisfactory for the needs of A&M.' 3
Tomatoes accumulated at the front of the machine, and some tomatoes
had to be run through the machine twice.' This resulted in many
damaged tomatoes and contributed to the spread of a fungus." 5 A
weight-sizing machine with a hydrocooler would have slowed the
spread of the fungus." 6 FMC repeatedly attempted, but failed, to
make the process more efficient." 7 By this time, A&M was unable
to secure another machine or hire enough additional labor to process
the fruit manually." 8 To minimize losses, A&M was forced to shut
down the tomato harvesting operation." 9
A&M offered to return the machine in exchange for return of the
104. Id. at 498, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
105. Id. at 499, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
109. Id. at 479, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117. The "field order" had the same exact terms as
the final contract that was signed. Id.
110. Id. at 479, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
111. Id. at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
112. Id. at 479, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 479, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 479-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
118. Id. at 480, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
119. Id.
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down payment.'20 When FMC rejected this offer, A&M brought suit. 2 '
The trial court found the waivers to be unconscionable and, therefore,
unenforceable.' 22 The court awarded A&M consequential damages of
over $250,000 (from which was subtracted the $12,090.70 due on the
machine) and attorneys' fees of $45,000. '23
The Fourth District Court of Appeal began its analysis by stating
that unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive
element.' 2 4 Both elements must be found in a commercial transaction
before a contract or contract clause can be declared unenforceable
as unconscionable.' 25 Two prongs of procedural unconscionability were
said to exist: unfair surprise and oppression.'26 Unfair surprise generally
is found when complex or hidden terms contained in the contract
are not contemplated by one of the parties.'2 7 The buyer in A&M
Produce was found to be surprised since the written contract was a
long preprinted form, only casually shown to the buyer. 2 ' The buyer
did not read the form and the seller did not suggest that he do so.' 29
The surprise, therefore, was unfair since the terms were complex and
the seller failed to direct the buyer's attention to them. 3 ' Oppression
is defined as unequal bargaining power resulting in an absence of
meaningful choice.' In this case, the test for oppression also was
met by the unequal bargaining power resulting in an absence of mean-
ingful choice or of negotiation of terms.' 32
The court did not define substantive unconscionability.'" The court,
however, noted that the "minimum levels of integrity" test used by
the California Supreme Court in Graham is analogous to substantive
unconscionability.' 3 4 A contract term was held to be substantively
120. Id.
121. Id. at 480, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
122. Id. at 480-81, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
123. Id. at 481, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118; see also Lara v. Tate, No. 224664-3 (Fresno County,
1983). The Sacramento Bee reported that in this case, a farmer had been persuaded to pur-
chase a particular model of engine to power his irrigation pumps. In facts strikingly similar
to those in A&M Produce, the engines failed to perform adequately and the farmer sued for
breach of warranty, seeking over $500,000 in consequential damages. The case settled out of
court for approximately $150,000. Goble, Farmers' Day In Court, The Sacramento Bee, Dec.
27, 1983, at D10, col. 4.
124. A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
125. Id. at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
126. Id. at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
132. Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
133. Id. at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
134. Id. at 488, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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suspect if the term reallocated the risks of the bargain in an objec-
tively unreasonable or unexpected manner.' Under this test, the war-
ranty disclaimer and damage exclusion clauses of FMC were found
to be substantively suspect since the seller knew the buyer was inex-
perienced and had, therefore, relied on the representations of the
seller.' 36 In addition, the seller was aware of the potential consequen-
tial damages that the buyer would face if the product were to fail.' 37
The risk allocation provided by the contract was found to be un-
conscionable since the seller was in the best position to prevent the
occurrence of these consequential damages by not selling the inade-
quate machine to the buyer.' 38 In the opinion of the court, FMC had
not guaranteed that the weight-sizing machine would do anything. '
The court analogized to products liability,'40 master-servant,' 4 ' and
nuisance'42 situations in declaring that risk of loss should be allocated
to the party who is in the best position to prevent that loss.' 43 Reliance
by the court on tort theory has been criticized 44 since the UCC ap-
parently allows the allocation of risks.'4 5 Overly broad disclaimers,
like the one used by FMC, however, go beyond the "allocation of
unknown or undeterminable risks" referred to in the UCC.14 6 A
disclaimer is a useful and necessary tool for a seller to eliminate those
risks that feasibly cannot be prevented. 47 The court in A&M Pro-
duce was reacting to the use of a complete disclaimer of all warran-
135. Id. at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
136. Id. at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
137. Id. at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
138. Id. at 493, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
139. Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
140. Id. at 491-92, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125, citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), the famous concurring opinion of Justice Traynor who argued
that strict liability be adopted for defective products cases.
141. A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125, citing Rodgers v.
Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 618, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148 (1975), a case spreading
the risk under the theory of respondeat superior.
142. A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125, citing 0. HOLMES,
JR., THE Co miON LAW 117 (1881)(Little, Brown & Co. ed. 1951), where Justice Holmes discusses
the risk shifting of nuisance cases such as Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330; L.R. 1 Ex.
265; 4 H.&C. 263 (1868).
143. A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 491-92, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125. See also Wiener,
Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation,
20 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 233, 253 n.98 (1983). Judge Wiener, the author of the A&M Produce
opinion, cites Escola and A&M Produce for a general social policy favoring the allocation
of risk of loss to the party best able to prevent its occurrence. Id.
144. See Note, Unconscionability Redefined: California Imposes New Duties on Commer-
cial Parties Using Form Contracts, 35 HAsTINGs L.J. 161, 178-79 (1983).
145. Id. But see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
146. U.C.C. §2-719(3), comment 3.
147. Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty Under the U.C.C. - How to Succeed
in Business Without Being Liable for Not Really Trying, 46 DEN. L.J. 579, 625 (1969).
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ties and liabilities for consequential damages after the seller had in-
duced the buyer to rely on the seller's assessment of the buyer's
needs.'48
The court adopted a sliding scale approach to resolve the uncon-
scionability challenge.' 9 Under this approach, a court must find both
procedural and substantive unconscionability, but the magnitude of
each kind of unconscionability may vary.150 If significant indications
of procedural unconscionability are found, less substantive unconscion-
ability is required, and vice versa,"' In addition, the court held that
a finding of procedural unconscionability triggers heightened scrutiny
of the substantive provisions of the agreement. 5 2 Thus, when abuses
occur in the bargaining process, the court will review with heightened
scrutiny the manner in which contract terms allocate risks between
the parties.'1 3
A&M Produce is not typical of cases in which unconscionability
is used as a bar to enforcement of a contract provision. The usual
party seeking relief on the ground of unconscionability has a distinct
bargaining disadvantage. Examples include welfare recipients,1S"
uneducated service station operators,' 55 and consumers victimized by
high pressure sales tactics.' 56 Language barriers have also been found
to prevent fair bargaining.157
No bargaining defects of this type existed in A&M Produce. The
buyer was relatively sophisticated and knovledgeable.' 58 A competitive
bid had been acquired which put the buyer on notice of product
differences.'" Although a form contract drafted by the seller was used,
this practice is common in commercial transactions between
merchants.' 60 The lack of a distinct bargaining disadvantage
distinguishes A&M Produce from other unconscionability cases.
148. A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
149. Id. at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Willams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
155. See Johnson v. Mobil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Weaver v.
American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ind. 1971).
156. See Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd
on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Term 1967); Kugler v. Romain, 29 A.2d
640, 643 (N.J. 1971).
157. See Frostifresh, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
158. A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
159. Id. at 478, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
160. See Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative
Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL. L. Rav. 481, 481 (1962).
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Moreover, in this case, the seller had disclaimed all warranties and
consequential damages in accordance with express provisions of the
UCC. Despite these facts, the court had little difficulty finding the
disclaimers unconscionable.
The potential value of any case as precedent has two extremes. 1 6'
A narrow holding confines the case to the unique facts involved.' 62
The precedential value of the case under a narrow holding, therefore,
is quite limited. A broader holding, on the other hand, increases the
impact of a case as precedent. 63 A&M Produce reasonably may be
understood to hold only that when a buyer is inexperienced with a
particular type of machine and the seller is aware of this lack of ex-
perience as well as the reliance of the buyer on the representations
of the seller, disclaimers of all warranties and consequential damages
are unconscionable when contained in the form contract of the seller.
A broader interpretation of A&M Produce is also possible. This
holding would mandate that whenever a seller uses a form contract
containing a warranty disclaimer or a consequential damage disclaimer,
heightened scrutiny of the disclaimer is required by the court (regardless
of the relative economic size and sophistication of the bargaining par-
ties), to ensure that risk shifting has not occurred in an unreasonable
or unexpected way.
Although still not clearly defined, unconscionability was the con-
trol mechanism used by the courts in both Graham and A&M Pro-
duce to cure what were perceived to be abuses of dominant bargain-
ing power by one party. In considering a contract for services that
was found to be an adhesion contract, the California Supreme Court
in Graham provided the framework for analyzing all commercial trans-
actions for unconscionability and paved the way for A&M Produce.
Further, the broader holding of A&M Produce is amply supported
by the California common law relating to unconscionability and the
use of standardized contracts. Doctrine developed in courts outside
California employing UCC section 2-302 and in commentary analyz-
ing that section provide additional support for the broader interpreta-
tion. These persuasive and secondary authorities become particularly
useful sources in light of the adoption of California Civil Code sec-
tion 1670.5, which is identical to the language and comments of UCC
section 2-302. Thus, a comparison of the analysis of the reasoning
in A&M Produce with the analytic framework developed in the sec-
161. See R. KEnso & C. KELso, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 24, 88-89 (1984).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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tion 2-302 cases and commentary will be useful in addressing the
ultimate question of the extent to which unconscionability is an ap-
propriate theory to use as a bar to the enforcement of standardized
contract forms.
C. Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability
The substantial body of doctrine developed under UCC section 2-302
focuses on the bifurcation of unconscionability analysis into procedural
and substantive elements. 6 ' Courts'65 and commentators'66 have defined
"unfair surprise" and "oppression" as the key elements of procedural
unconscionability. Cases decided under section 2-302 have been relative-
ly successful in developing standards for these terms. "Unfair sur-
prise" entails what the buyer knew or should have known at the time
the contract was formed, as evidenced by course of dealing and usage
of trade,' 67 or, as set forth in section 2-302(2), the commercial set-
ting, purpose, and effect.' 6 The buyer's educational background, grasp
of the English language, socio-economic position, and general business
acumen and experience are all relevant to this inquiry.'6 9
"Oppression" has been more difficult to define. The comments to
164. See, e.g., J. WITE & R. StM.MRs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM,
COMMERCIAL CODE §§4-3 - 4-7, (2d. ed. 1980); Dugan, supra note 34, at 77; Eddy, On the
"Essential" Purpose of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(3), 65 CALIF.
L. REv. 28, 41 (1977); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 762
(1969); Schwartz, A Reexamination ofNonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053,
1053 (1977); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931, 941
(1969). But see Murray, supra note 42, at 21 (procedural and substantive are more labels
substituted for analysis); Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv.
741, 754 (1982)(distinction is too rigid to be useful); Gordley, Equality In Exchange, 69 CALIF.
L. REv. 1587, 1633-36 (1981) (procedural unconscionability is not helpful without also finding
substantive unconscionability); Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A
New Framework For U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1981) (categories
add to confusion and may perpetuate manipulation).
165. See, e.g., FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 1980); A&M
Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121; Wille v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906 (Kan. 1976).
166. See, e.g., Eddy, supra note 164, at 42; Spanogle, supra note 164, at 943.
167. See Geldermann & Co., Inc. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir.
1975); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Engineering Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1309
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); see also
U.C.C. §§1-205(1) (course of dealing), 1-205(2) (usage of trade); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors,
Inc., 544 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash. 1975).
168. U.C.C. §2-302(2) provides:
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to pre-
sent evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
169. See Johnson 415 F. Supp. at 268.
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section 2-302 cite Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz' 7° to identify a stan-
dard for oppression. This case is known for the reliance the court
placed on the overall imbalance of the terms of the contract as the
basis for refusing enforcement of the contract as written.' 7' The use
of a generalized approach, without specific attention to the components
of overall balance or imbalance, has been criticized as inappropriate
for cases arising under section 2-302 since the UCC requires a. clause-
by-clause analysis.' 71 Other commentators have emphasized inequal-
ity of bargaining power and the absence of choice regarding contract
terms as the most important factors to consider in finding the op-
pression aspect of procedural unconscionability.' 73 These are the same
factors, however, that support a finding of an adhesion contract. 74
Thus, the determination that an agreement is an adhesion contract
would also be a finding of procedural unconscionability.' 75 Concern
about this result has forced commentators to elaborate on their defini-
tion of oppression by adding terms such as gross inequality of bargain-
ing power,' 76 or compulsion, or by requiring the subject matter to
be an item of necessity.' 77 Some of the additional tests for finding
the oppression prong of procedural unconscionability implicate elements
of substantive unconscionability,'17 thereby further complicating the
analysis.
Few clear definitions of substantive unconscionability have been of-
fered. One theory for this lack of clarity holds that the drafters of
the UCC intended an ambiguity so that the courts would develop
guidelines in light of commercial realities.' 79 The definitions offered
by commentators have concentrated on the reasonableness or harshness
170. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
171. See Leff, supra note 55, at 538; Ellinghaus, supra note 164, at 776.
172. See Leff, supra note 55, at 538. But compare Ellinghaus, supra note 164, at 775-86
(overall imbalance a major species of unconscionability used by courts); Hillman, supra note
164, at 34. Hillman argues that the elements to be considered in finding overall imbalance
are essentially the same as are required to find component unconscionability. Id.
173. See Eddy, supra note 164, at 42; Spanogle, supra note 164, at 943.
174. Compare supra note 87, with A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 493, 186 Cal. Rptr.
at 126.
175. See Ellinghaus, supra note 164, at 766-67; Spanogle, supra note 164, at 944.
176. See FMC Finance Corp., 632 F.2d at 420; Geldermann & Co., 527 F.2d at 575; Wille,
549 P.2d at 906; Henningsen 161 A.2d at 87; Eddy, supra note 164, at 42.
177. See Steele v. J.I. Case Co., 419 P.2d 902, 910 (Kan. 1966); see also Murray, supra
note 42, at 23-28 (materiality of the risks part of analysis).
178. See Ellinghaus, supra note 164, at 767; see also Wille, 549 P.2d at 906.
179. See Spanogle, supra note 164, at 936-37; see also Eisenberg, supra note 164, at 752-54
(open-ended definition of unconscionability preferred); Murray, supra note 42, at 36 (courts
are to develop the machinery).
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of the resulting terms of a contract 80 or on the propriety of allocating
a particular risk to one party rather than the other."8 ' Courts and
commentators both have focused on the subject matter of the con-
tract clause,' the level of knowledge accorded each contracting party,
and the reasonableness of those levels of knowledge.'83 The reasonable
expectations of the parties have also been proposed as a
consideration.8 4 However, this consideration entails a procedural ele-
ment because attention is focused on the bargaining position and
relative economic status of the buyer and seller. Bargaining position
and relative economic status are relevant considerations for procedural
unconscionability. To consider these factors twice is unfair to the party
who seeks to avoid a finding of unconscionability and to enforce the
contract.
When discussing the risk allocation factors, the UCC comments
to section 2-302 state that the principle of the section is not one "of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power. "115 Although this language largely has been ignored by the
courts and commentators,' 86 one commentator argues that in the
analysis of risk allocation (one measure of substantive unconscionabil-
ity), the UCC comment is important as an indication that risk shift-
ing is allowed under the UCC.'87 The analysis has been further com-
plicated by a disagreement that has developed concerning whether sec-
tion 2-302 and risk allocation considerations should apply to war-
180. See Eddy, supra note 164, at 44-45; Ellinghaus, supra note 164, at 784; Spanogle,
supra note 164, at 950.
181. See Eddy, supra note 164, at 47-48; Murray, supra note 42, at 12-34.
182. See A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 478-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18; Steele,
419 P.2d at 910; Murray, supra note 42, at 41.
183. See, e.g., Geldermann & Co., 527 F.2d at 575; Johnson, 415 F. Supp. at 269; Weaver,
276 N.E.2d at 148.
184. See, e.g., A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 492-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26; Steele,
419 P.2d at 910; Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696, 700 (S.D. 1982); Schroeder,
544 P.2d at 24; see also Hillman, supra note 164, at 29. Hillman identifies the expectations
of the party claiming unconscionability as a factor to be considered by the court when no
bargaining infirmities exist. Id.
185. U.C.C. §2-302, comment 1.
186. See Dugan, supra note 34, at 83-84, n.31; see also J. WHITE & R. SutMEaRs, supra
note 164, at '§4-3, p. 151 (court may disturb allocation of risk); Leff, supra note 55, at 499-501
(language inconsistent); Murray, supra note 42, at 40-41 (allocation of risks must be disturbed)(em-
phasis in original); Spanogle, supra note 164, at 942 (inconsistent language). But cf. Wille,
549 P.2d at 907 (no equality in bargaining power required, citing Ellinghaus); W.L. May Co.,
Inc. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 543 P.2d 283, 287 (Or. 1975)(court relied heavily on this language
in a commercial transaction); Eddy, supra note 164, at 44-48 (risks can be allocated in a com-
mercial setting, therefore the courts should look to avoidability of result and to whom the
risk was allocated); Ellinghaus, supra note 164, at 766-67 (mere disparity of bargaining power
not sufficient for a finding of unconscionability).
187. See Eddy, supra note 164, at 44-48.
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ranty and consequential damage disclaimers since special problems are
presented due to the competing interests of the contracting parties.
UNCONSCIONABILITY OF WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS AND DAMAGE
LIMITATION CLAUSES
Cases involving the doctrine of unconscionability frequently involve
warranty disclaimers and damage limitation clauses. '88 Many manufac-
turers use both of these provisions. Since the UCC expressly provides
that a seller may disclaim warranties' 9 or limit the availability of
remedies,' 90 some commentators have suggested, and a few courts have
accepted, the idea that if a warranty disclaimer meets the conspicuous
provision standards of section 2-316(2), the disclaimer should be im-
mune from the reach of section 2-302.' 9' The majority of courts and
commentators, however, have rejected this interpretation as being in-
consistent with the intent of the drafters to have section 2-302 apply
to all UCC article two transactions.' 92 Warranty disclaimers and
damage limitation clauses invariably are found in the boilerplate
language of a contract. Failure on the buyer's part to consider the
terms of boilerplate clauses does not make them unconscionable but
does make them suspect in any future analysis for substantive
unconscionability.' 93
Knowledge that a sliding scale approach is employed by the court
requires the seller to weigh the costs of a form contract against in-
dividualized negotiations. Negotiating each term of a contract separate-
ly, with the opportunity to reduce the scope of the disclaimer (perhaps
in return for a higher price), would lessen the likelihood of a finding
of procedural unconscionability in a commercial transaction.' 9 Thus,
more evidence of substantive unconscionability would be required to
declare the negotiated form contract unenforceable. Of course,
negotiating each term of a contract results in much higher transac-
tional costs to the seller and reduces some of the social benefits gained
from the use of standardized forms.195
Undertaking a substantive unconscionability analysis in warranty
188. See, e.g., FMC Finance Corp., 632 F.2d at 419; County Asphalt, 323 F. Supp. at
1308; Steele, 419 P.2d at 908; Durham, 315 N.W.2d at 699; Schroeder, 544 P.2d at 23.
189. U.C.C. §2-316(2).
190. U.C.C. §2-719(3).
191. See, E. FARNSwORTH, supra note 20, at §4.28 (summarizing commentators and cases).
192. See id.
193. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 87; FMC Finance Corp., 632 F.2d at 419; Steele, 419
P.2d at 910.
194. See Moye, supra note 147, at 626.
195. See Rakoff, supra note 46, at 1221.
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disclaimer and damage limitation clause cases is difficult because of
the motivations and competing interests of the parties. While the UCC
provides that all warranties may be disclaimed and all economic con-
sequential damages may be excluded, some commentators have stated
that no merchant would include a complete disclaimer due to the lack
of confidence that disclaimers would generate among buyers and the
subsequent effect this would have on sales. 96 The naivete of this view
is amply demonstrated in the cases' 9 7 and commmentary.' 98 To keep
costs as low as possible, sellers consistently include disclaimers to reduce
potential liablility.'99 Buyers, on the other hand, often desire that the
seller bear as much of the risk as possible.
The seller's familiarity with the product and the seller's knowledge
about potential defect or performance problems causes many buyers
to feel that the seller is in the best position to anticipate these risks
and should, therefore, bear them.2 °0 The reasonableness of each party's
expectations seems to be an important consideration in the risk alloca-
tion analysis of substantive unconscionability. 20 I The court in A&M
Produce considered these factors, as well as the more general com-
mercial reasonableness of the transaction.2 2 The difficulty with this
type of analysis is that the relative bargaining power of the contrac-
ting parties becomes a relevant factor in both the procedural and
substantive analyses. This is not fair to the seller since the relative
disparity in bargaining power is one of the main reasons for finding
procedural unconscionablility. Thus, since the existence of procedural
unconscionability raises the level of scrutiny of the substantive nature
of the contract terms, consideration of unequal bargaining power a
second time, as a part of substantive unconscionability analysis, is
prejudicial to the seller. In reviewing the substantive content of the
contract terms, the factors relating to the existence or absence of pro-
cedural unconscionability should not be considered.2 3 In an analogous
situation, some commentators have urged that a contract term should
be unenforceable if the term is substantively unconscionable, regardless
of the procedural circumstances. These commentators have advocated
196. See CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, I CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL LAW
§6.104 (1966).
197. See Eddy, supra note 164, at 47-48; Murray, supra note 42, at 12-34.
198. See Moye, supra note 147, at 625.
199. See Rakoff, supra note 46, at 1221.
200. Cf. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d 462, 150 P.2d. 436 (Traynor, J., concurring).
201. See Steele, 429 P.2d at 910; see also Murray, supra note 42, at 23-28 (materiality
of the risks part of the analysis).
202. A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
203. See Dugan, supra note 34, at 99.
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an analysis of the substantive content of a contract term that isolates
the term from the bargaining process or transaction. 04
The A&M Produce risk allocation analysis of substantive uncon-
scionability is well-suited to this isolated or nontransactional approach.
Use of risk allocation to determine substantive unconscionability would
focus the attention of the court on the actual terms employed in
disclaimer provisions, the purpose of those terms, and whether the
contract provides for some alternate relief for the buyer. 20 5 The seller
may demonstrate what protections or remedies are available to the
buyer under the contract terms, the relative value of those terms, and
whether the availability of the disclaimer affected the price of the
goods involved." 6 The final question to consider is the judicial stan-
dard of review that should be applied when unconscionability is used
as a defense in a commercial transaction.
APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL STANDARDS
The unfair surprise element of procedural unconscionability is
perhaps the easiest form of unconscionability to establish. Unfair sur-
prise can be established by the same kind of evidence that is used
to prove duress, misrepresentation, and fraud actions. 20 7 A seller can
avoid a finding of unfair surprise with evidence of specific expres-
sion of assent, such as the buyer's initials in a space provided adja-
cent to the disputed clause.208 Given the judicial dislike for situations
in which a person in a superior bargaining position has dictated self-
serving terms to the other party, the burden generally should be on
the seller to show that the buyer understood the disputed term.20 9
This may require greater coaching of salespersons but is not an in-
surmountable obstacle.
Use of a form contract nearly always will result in the court find-
ing the contract to be one of adhesion.210 This result, by itself, should
not mean that disputed terms are oppressive and, thus, procedurally
204. Id.
205. See id. at 84.
206. See id.
207. See Ellinghaus, supra note 164, at 763; see also Hillman, supra note 164, at 6-9. Hillman
refers to fraud and duress as some of the traditional policing doctrines which should be used
by courts to remedy bargaining misconduct. Id. Inclusion of these policing doctrines in the
bargaining process branch of unconscionability results in a clearer application of unconscionability.
Id. at 24.
208. See Moye, supra note 147, at 628.
209. See Johnson, 415 F. Supp. at 269; Weaver, 276 N.E.2d at 148.
210. See Calamari, supra note 35, at 352 n.74 (noting some commentators use the terms
standardized contract and contract of adhesion interchangeably). But cf. Rakoff, supra, note
46, at 1176-77 (standard form is not always a contract of adhesion).
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unconscionable. Significant disparity in the bargaining power of the
parties, however, or an unfulfilled reasonable expectation of the party
with inferior bargaining power will cause a court to find a disputed
clause oppressive."' Given the significant advantages of using a form
contract, a seller is likely to decide to accept the risk that certain
terms may be found oppressive and concentrate instead on avoiding
unfair surprise and substantive unconscionability.2 2
Substantive unconscionability is most useful if directed only to the
nontransactional elements of risk allocation in the contract.2' 3 Expec-
tations of the contracting parties should not be considered at this stage
of the unconscionability analysis. Evidence of an unfulfilled expecta-
tion can support a finding of oppression which, in turn, will lead
to heightened scrutiny of the substantive aspects of disputed terms
if the sliding scale approach adopted in A&M Produce is used. This
heightened scrutiny will often result in a finding that the risk alloca-
tion in contract terms, particularly in disclaimers, is commercially
unreasonable. In view of the consequences of this heightened stan-
dard of review, consideration of procedural flaws a second time in
the substantive analysis is manifestly unfair. The reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties, therefore, should only be relevant in the pro-
cedural unconscionability analysis.
The substantive unconscionability analysis should concentrate on
what the seller has expressly or impliedly promised the buyer. For
instance, in a contract for the sale of a machine, the focus of the
analysis would be on what the machine will do, the remedies of the
buyer if the machine fails to perform as promised, and whether the
failure was one which only the seller, only the buyer, or both could
have anticipated or avoided. An attempt to shift to the buyer the
costs of a product failure that only the seller could anticipate would
be substantively unconscionable.2""
A special difficulty arises when both parties could have avoided
the loss. 21I The court must consider whether the remaining remedies
of the buyer are adequate. This requires the court to evaluate whether
the risk allocation that the seller has attempted bears a reasonable
relation to the business risk.2" 6 As in products liability cases, only
the seller is in a position to bear the burden of persuasion on this
211. See supra notes 170-178 and accompanying text.
212. See Schwartz, note 164, at 1070 n.35.
213. See supra notes 179-184 and accompanying text.
214. See Eddy, supra note 164, at 47-48; Moye, supra note 147, at 625-26.
215. See Eddy, supra note 164, at 47.
216. See May, 543 P.2d at 287; Ellinghaus, supra note 164, at 784.
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issue.2" 7 Thus, once procedural unconscionability has been shown to
exist, shifting the burden of proof on risk allocation from the buyer
to the seller should be required.2" 8
Factors such as the fundamental nature of the product to the buyer,
the expectations of the buyer, the commercial reasonableness of those
expectations, and the buyer's knowledge that he accepted a risk are
all relevant to evaluating the procedural fairness of the transaction
but not in analyzing the substantive nature of a disputed term.2"9 These
factors, as well as the public policy considerations, are more applicable
to an analysis of whether the buyer did have any freedom of con-
tract in the traditional sense. Courts resolving commercial disputes
have generally emphasized the need to allow the parties freedom to
contract.22 Public policy considerations are useful in deciding whether
a true arm's length transaction occurred and, therefore, whether the
buyer had true freedom of contract. 22' If, however, no true freedom
of contract is found, the adverse impact on the bargaining process
should contribute to a finding of procedural unconscionability but
should not affect the analysis of the substantive nature of the con-
tract terms.222
CONCLUSION
While no further limits on the freedom of contract are desired than
those that are absolutely necessary, much authority supports the idea
that the prevalence of standard forms in many commercial trans-
actions requires greater scrutiny of both the bargaining process and
boilerplate terms. 223 Emerging case law which bars enforcement of
contract provisions in standardized forms is premised on unconscion-
ability claims. 224 Despite criticism of the bifurcation of unconscion-
217. See Moye, supra note 147, at 625-26 (seller should research the potential damages in
defining the potential risk to be allocated to the buyer); see also supra notes 138-148 and ac-
companying text (A&M Produce analysis of risk allocation analogizing to products liability
situations).
218. See Hillman, supra note 164, at 34-35, n.185. The party claiming unconscionability
should have the burden of producing evidence of reasonable expectations and status. This burden
then shifts to the other party to justify the fairness of the term in light of the commercial
setting. Id. But cf. CAL. CoM. CODE §2719(3), supra note 3. The section was amended by
the California Legislature to clarify the allocation of the burden of proof to the party claiming
unconscionability. Id.
219. See Allen v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 171 N.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Mich. Ct. App.
1969).
220. See id. at 692.
221. See id.
222. A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
223. See supra notes 20-52 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text (Graham) and notes 91-153 and accom-
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ability analysis into procedural and substantive elements which must
be satisfied to bar enforcement of contract provisions, including
disclaimers, 225 the A&M Produce case points the way for a disci-
plined approach to resolving unconscionability claims.226 Clearly ex-
pressed procedural and substantive tests should result in greater cer-
tainty and predictability in commercial transactions using standard
forms. Further, heightened scrutiny of the bargaining process as well
as the fairness of boilerplate terms will result in greater freedom of
contract for all parties since sellers will be encouraged to ensure that
buyers enter into contracts with greater knowledge of the terms.
Sellers should be able to avoid the unfair surprise prong of pro-
cedural unconscionability with a few simple safeguards in their bargain-
ing process. 227 A seller using a standardized form, however, runs a
high risk that a court will find a disputed clause oppressive.228 In
an analysis of substantive unconscionability, a court should focus on
the commercial reasonableness of the risk allocation, as did the analysis
of the court in A&M Produce.22 The procedural aspects of the con-
tract should be removed from consideration of this risk allocation.23
Employment of the judicial standards proposed in this comment,
will result in a clear analysis of the fairness of a standardized con-
tract or contract term, which, in turn, promotes greater freedom of
contract.
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panying text (A&M Produce).
225. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 124-153 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 210-222 and accompanying text.
229. See A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
230. See supra notes 200-204 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 207-222 and accompanying text.
